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Protection needs in HD - the facts (2000)
Andy Smith 
 
[This paper was first published in the JMU Journal of Mine Action in
April 2000. The number of recorded accidents in the DDAS has
increased by a factor of 10 since this was written 15 years ago, but
the general conclusions remain very similar. The only significant
change has been in the number of deaths caused by ordnance and
IEDs following recent conflict, usually involving devices that could
not be realistically protected against with body armour.]
I have approached this subject by studying the risks that deminers
really face and the injuries that result, then working out how to
minimise risk and protect against any residual danger. I bore in mind
that there was no point is prescribing an action or a garment that
would not be used. This is not an approach widely endorsed in the
protective equipment industry, which apparently prefers to base its
assessment of risk on experimental data and a scale of injury
borrowed from the automobile industry. If the injuries commonly
predicted by them were accurate, most of the accident victims I
have worked with would have been dead.
Anyone considering this matter objectively should bear in mind that
demining accidents are rare. While I do not have all the relevant
data, I believe that severe accidents occur at the rate of one per 25-
30 man-years of actual demining. This statement ignores the facts
that some groups have more accidents than others (perhaps
working in more dangerous areas) and only serves to explain why it
is that most actual deminers have not seen a serious accident and
will not wear equipment that they believe is unnecessary.
The following paper draws on my five years of field research and my
knowledge of the Database of Demining Incident Victims (DDIV).
The DDIV covers all recorded explosive incidents that have
occurred while demining in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bosnia
Herzegovina, Laos and Zimbabwe. It also covers all the accidents
that occurred in Afghanistan between 1997 and 1999 and those
made available from Kosovo. It does not include details of civilian
accidents and injuries. Often with considerable detail about the
circumstances surrounding an accident, the records provide a
reference for informed analysis.
The DDIV has been accepted as an authoritative resource by
GICHD in its work advising on the revision of UN standards for HD.
The DDIV is available on CD. Contact me for details. [The DDIV
became the Database of Demining Accidents when it ecame a
relational database in 2003.]
The first part of this paper gives facts in support of the discussion
that follows.
1 The facts
1.1 Threat activities
There are many opinions of what constitutes the greatest threat in
demining. Using the DDIV, genuine threat activities can be listed in
terms of incident type and frequency.
The type of accident is followed by the number of recorded victims
Excavation 119
Missed-mine 85
Handling 32
Victim inattention 25
Detection/tripwire 18
Survey 16
Vegetation removal 12
Other 10
Demolition 7
Detection 6
[The activity titles are defined in full in the
DDIV.]
 
1.2 Injuries sustained
In the DDIV, injuries likely to be life-threatening, to require surgery or
to result in permanent disability are rated as “severe”. All others are
rated as “minor”.
For the whole database the following injuries are recorded:
Body part Severe /amp. Minor
Eye 60 37
Face/head 41 139
Hand/finger 68 118
Arm 38 66
Leg 103 94
Foot/toes 27 10
Body 13 36
Chest 18 37
Genital 11 5
1.3 Devices involved
The following records the devices that are most commonly involved
in recorded incidents.
The Blast mine threat in the various theatres can be summarised as:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Mozambique – PMN (240g
TNT).
Angola – PPM-2 (110g TNT), PMN.
Bosnia-Herzegovina – PMA-3 (35g Tetryl),
PMA-2 (100g TNT).
Cambodia – PMN-2, Type 72 (51g TNT),
M14, MD82B (27/28g). 
Kosovo – PMA-2 (100g TNT).
Zimbabwe – R2M2 (58g RDX/WAX).
The PMN represents the largest AP blast threat and is present in
most theatres.
The fragmentation mine threat is far less common and can be
summarised as:
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia – POMZ
(75g TNT) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina – PROM-1 (425g TNT).
Iraq – the Valmara-69 (450g Comp B) and
PROM-1 (425g TNT). 
Laos – a mortar features in the only recorded
injury.
Mozambique – OZM-4 (170g TNT).
The PROM-1 represents the greatest threat (in terms of numbers of
accidents). The smallest fragmentation mine, the POMZ, is the most
universal threat.
The ordnance threat (crudely defined as explosive devices that are
not classed as mines) in the various theatres can be summarised as
“fuzes”. There have been very few UXO accidents, almost all of
which have involved fuzes and been minor.
2 Reducing risk
There are two obvious ways to reduce the risk of injury in an
accident. The first is to avoid the accident. The second is to provide
effective protective equipment.
Avoiding risk can be achieved by revising operating procedures, or
by enforcing the application of safe operating procedures. The DDIV
records 272 injuries where the primary cause was a management
inadequacy at some level. This was generally either the failure to
provide appropriate equipment or training or the failure to ensure
that deminers worked as trained. Clearly, improving controls at all
levels could be a very effective way of reducing accident numbers –
and it would take another paper to explain how I would approach
that.
When everything has been done to avoid an accident, provision
must be made to protect against residual risk. 
For brevity I only discuss protection needs in the four most common
accident types in the following. The other accident types were rare
and my conclusions are similar to those expressed for others.
Excavation of a suspect mine is the most common accident activity.
This is an activity that must be carried out and accidents have
occurred when no “mistake” was attributed to the victim. The “duty
of care” of an employer requires that a deminer be protected
appropriately when working as directed on a required task.
Missed-mine accidents are the second most common and indicate
that clearance has not been effective. Some time-served groups
have not had any missed-mine accidents: others have had many.
This implies that it is possible to work in a way that avoids them.
(Incidentally, there is no evidence that there is a greater risk of
missing a mine when demining in areas with minimum-metal mines).
The evidence in the DDIV suggests that the best defence against
the “missed-mine” risk is to avoid it by using proven working
methods that are adequately supervised.
Handling is the next most common accident and occurs when a
device or part of a device explodes in the hand. In several accidents
the victim did not recognise the risk, which could have been avoided
with appropriate training. Some groups seek to avoid the risk
altogether by not allowing devices to be handled (these groups have
still suffered these accidents). Practical protection is impossible, so
avoidance is the only way to reduce injuries.
Victim inattention is the next most common accident and covers
deminers behaving in a thoughtless manner. While close
supervision and rigorous training might have prevented some
accidents, it has to be accepted that moments of inattention occur.
Given that it is impossible to predict the nature of these accidents,
the only practical protection seems to be that used for other
accidents.
The only kind of accident that occurs despite a deminer acting
properly in accordance with his training and instructions is
“excavation” – which is also the most common accident. This is why
I believe it should provide the benchmark for protection needs (an
opinion shared by many field workers). 
3 Protection while excavating
To protect a deminer against accidents that occur when excavating
we must know the position he is in and the injuries he risks.
The data in the DDIV clearly illustrates that almost all deminers
excavate in a kneeling or squatting position (whatever their SOP).
This is good news for the deminer because he avoids the whiplash
acceleration injuries that might have been associated with having
his head within a few centimetres of a blast while his body remained
stationary. The exploding device is almost invariably directly in front
of and below his body and head. Often his hand is above or
alongside the device.
The following lists the number of severe (disabling) injuries recorded
while excavating.
Face & neck 54
Upper limb 51
Lower limb 7
Trunk 10
The low number of lower limb injuries illustrates the way that a
fragment cone rises from a seat of initiation and its core often
misses the legs (minor leg injuries were more common - 36). The
low number of trunk/body injuries illustrates how the main torso is
not threatened as much as the upper limbs and the head. (Half of
the severe body injuries were caused by parts of the victim’s hand-
tool.)
3.1 Face and neck protection
Despite the fact that some form of eye protection was issued, it was
not worn in almost half the recorded blast accidents and more than
one in three victims suffered eye injury.
Eye protection issued varies from industrial safety spectacles to
5mm polycarbonate visors. Visors made from 5mm polycarbonate
have been used by the most responsible groups for some years and
their use is spreading (MAG, HALO Trust, NPA, MgM, Koch
MineSafe, MineTech, INAROEE, most Bosnian and Croatian
groups, etc). Some of these are short and attach to helmets –
usually leaving the wearer’s throat exposed. Others are long and
worn without helmets. These offer some protection to the throat
when kneeling and looking down.
I have tested 5mm polycarbonate visors in over 40 tests using
mines. In one test, the visor was penetrated by a steel fragment in
the earth covering the mine. In several further tests against POMZ
fragmentation mines, the visor was not penetrated at all. One 5mm
visor broke in two in a recorded incident. These facts illustrate the
unpredictability of mines, but also shows that even 5mm
polycarbonate does not guarantee protection to a deminer
excavating an AP blast mine. It is, however, light enough for
sustained wear (thousands of deminers do so) and is the best
available option until a lighter, stronger material is developed.
The evidence suggests that 5mm polycarbonate visors that are fixed
in the “down” position should be provided for deminers excavating
AP blast mines.
 
3.2 Upper limb protection
The DDIV records 51 severe upper-limb injuries from blast mine
detonations (including 14 amputations of fingers and hands, and 10
of arms). The injuries were worst when the tool was short and used
vertically. When the tool broke up, deminers were struck in the
chest, upper arm and face. At least five deminers died after their
hand-tool fragmented in a blast.
The DDIV also provides evidence that tools which stay in one piece
do not injure the user.
Demining hand-tools should be designed so that they:
• are easiest to use a low angle to the
ground;
• stay in one piece;
• are long enough to keep the user’s hand at
least 30cm from the blast;
• incorporate a flexible blast shield whenever
possible without reducing utility.
Examples of such tools exist and are available on the commercial
market.
3.3 Body protection against fragmentation
Protection designed to reach a STANAG V50 of 450m/s (current UN
standard) has proved less than adequate against bounding
fragmentation mines. Deminers who let one off at close quarters
invariably die even when wearing protection. However, bounding
fragmentation mine incidents occur rarely outside Europe and there
are no records of a bounding fragmentation mine incident having
occurred while excavating (although I have anecdotal evidence of
one such incident in Kuwait). Protection against the close quarter
detonation of a bounding fragmentation mine would involve such a
weight of body armour that it is not practical, but the use of an
angled steel shield when setting charges on such devices might be
practical.
3.4 Body protection against blast
In the recorded excavation accidents where body armour was worn,
it did not fail, illustrating the fact that the current STANAG 450m/s
standard of body protection is sufficient (or more than sufficient)
against the largest AP blast-mine threat.
But a fragmentation V50 of 450m/s is no measure of blast
protection. Blast is a significantly different threat and the materials
used to protect against it may lack fragmentation resistance while
being highly effective against blast.
In an attempt to use more practical armour, there has been a
general move away from flak-jackets to the use of frontal “aprons”.
Some have a V50 as low as 380m/s, others over 500m/s. The only
sort to have failed in my tests had the higher V50 but was made up
of discrete panels that the blast separated. A one-piece apron with a
380m/s V50 has performed well in 7 tests and in at least 15 real
incidents.
The evidence shows that the need for body protection may not be a
high priority, but it is desirable, especially when it is comfortable
enough for a deminer to wear. Simple, frontal blast aprons have
proven capable of protecting an excavating deminer – and are
comfortable enough to be worn without protest.
The evidence suggests that deminers should be issued with frontal
blast protection (240g TNT at 30cm) for use when excavating.
3.5 No protection because no proven risk
There are a number of products available that offer protection
against risks that the facts suggest are not real. There is, for
example, no evidence of over-pressure internal injuries from any AP
blast mine. There is also no evidence to suggest that blast-proof
boots would have significantly reduced injury (most occurred with
mines far larger than those used in “successful” boot trials). There is
no evidence that wearing a helmet or an armour back-panel has
ever significantly reduced injury.
Protection against hearing damage is sometimes suggested. There
were many claims of hearing damage in Afghanistan during a period
when compensation was paid for small, unverifiable hearing loss.
Excluding Afghanistan, there is only one claim of severe hearing
damage resulting from a single blast in the DDIV (the claimant was
in close proximity to a very large ambush device). The risk is, at
worst, very low.
4 Wrapping it up
As I see it, there are two practical approaches to meeting deminer
protection needs. These are:
a) Reducing the number of accidents that
occur.
b) Reducing the severity of injury when an
accident occurs.
The first can be pursued via changes to working methods and
improved supervision – and is likely to have most effect. The second
can be pursued via the provision of PPE appropriate for use at times
when risk cannot be avoided.
The practical personal protective equipment I recommend is:
• Fixed eye protection with a blast
performance and fragmentation protection
equal to that offered by untreated 5mm
polycarbonate. 
• Hand-tools that are fit for purpose and that
are designed to minimise the risk of adding to
injury.
• Comfortable frontal blast protection (against
240g TNT at 30cm/12”) for use when
excavating. The inclusion of a collar that
overlaps the visor and closes any access to
the throat from below is desirable.
Some groups already do most of the above. A few have done so for
many years. This provides evidence that my suggestions are
practical, and the DDIV provides evidence that they are needed.
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